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Indonesia adalah satu negara yang sedang membangun  yang mempunyai nisbah cukai GDP 
sekitar 12% dan ini dianggap rendah oleh standard antarabangsa.  Nisbah yang rendah ini 
mungkin  disebabkan oleh kekurangan formaliti dan pengelakan cukai termasuk amalan rasuah . 
Demi menjamin punca pendapatan negara dan meningkatkan pendapatan melalui cukai, badan 
yang menguruskan cukai perlu melakukan audit cukai yang boleh meminimakan pengelakan 
cukai. Salah satu cabaran audit cukai ialah rasuah kerana ia memberi kelebihan kepada juruaudit 
cukai dan pembayar cukai iaitu kelebihan dari segi ekonomi. Oleh itu, kajian ini menilai faktor-
faktor yang menyebabkan berlakunya rasuah di dalam audit cukai, persepsi mereka yang 
berkepentingan  tentang strategi-strategi yang sedia ada dan baru untuk mengurangkan rasuah di 
dalam audit cukai dan kesan reformasi cukai ke arah pengurangan cukai audit di Indonesia. 
Kajian kualitatif ini menyelami dua perspektif berbeza iaitu melalui pengalaman juruaudit cukai 
dan pembayar cukai yang menggunakan temubual  sebagai kaedah pengumpulan data. Hasil 
kajian menunjukkan  terdapat beberapa faktor yang menyebabkan rasuah berlaku di dalam audit 
cukai seperti keuntungan, kuasa yang berlebihan, syarat cukai yang tidak jelas, dapatan awal dan 
pertemuan secara bersemuka oleh juruaudit cukai dan pembayar cukai. Hasil kajian yang lain 
adalah seperti cadangan strategi tambahan bagi mengurangkan rasuah iaitu melalui kebenaran 
tambahan, sistem kira-kira yang kukuh, sistem pemantauan yang dinaiktaraf, penambahan kualiti 
audit, pelebaran rangkaian cukai, peningkatan nilai moral, pembaikan proses merekrut dan 
penghasilan dapatan awal yang konsisten. Kajian ilmiah ini membentangkan perspektif yang 
lebih baik untuk meminimakan rasuah di dalam proses audit cukai di Indonesia dan memberi 
maklum balas kepada kerajaan Indonesia untuk meningkatkan syarat yang sedia ada berkaitan 







Indonesia as one of the developing countries has a Tax-to-GDP ratio around 12%, which is 
considered low by international standard. To a large extent, this reflects prevalent lack of 
formality and tax evasion including bribery which decrease the national tax revenue. To secure 
government income and to increase tax revenue, tax authorities conduct tax audits which could 
minimize tax evasions. One of the challenges in tax audit is bribery as within this process there is 
a mutual benefit between tax auditors and taxpayers, which is economic benefit. Thus this study 
examines the factors leading to bribery in tax audit, the stakeholders’ perceptions on existing and 
additional new strategies in reducing bribery in tax audit and the impact of tax reform on 
reducing bribery in tax audit in Indonesia. This is a qualitative study exploring two different 
perspectives from tax auditors and taxpayers’ experience using in-depth interviews as the data 
collection method. Among the findings, are factors leading to bribery in tax audit which are 
:benefit, excessive power, ambiguous tax regulation, preliminary findings and direct encounter. 
Other findings are the suggested additional strategies to reduce bribery through additional 
sanctions, a reliable accounting system, increasing monitoring system, improving audit quality, 
expanding the tax coverage, increasing moral consciousness, improving recruitment process and 
producing consistent tax audit findings. This study presents a better perspective on how to 
minimize bribery opportunity in tax audit process in Indonesia and gives some feedbacks for 
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1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
According to the Statistic Indonesia,  the government’s revenue from taxation in Indonesia is  
IDR 1,019,333 billion compared to the non taxation revenue which is IDR 272,720 billion 
(“Actual Government Revenue”, 2013).  The revenue from taxation in Indonesia is significant, 
about 79% from the total government revenue in 2012, which shows the importance of taxation 
as a source of income for the government. The  decline in mining and export sectors forced the 
Indonesian government to revise its 2013 state budget on tax revenue to IDR 1,139.3 trillion 
which was originally IDR 1, 193 trillion (“Indonesia’s Government”, 2013). 
Although the revenue from taxation in Indonesia is significant, the tax to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) ratio in Indonesia is still below 12% (Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development [OECD], 2012). This is considered low by international standard and is 
expected to increase to 12.11 % in 2013.  
The definition of tax-to-GDP ratio is the total government tax collection divided by the country’s 
GDP. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a tax revenue equivalent to 15% of 
GDP is a “reasonable” minimum level for low-income countries to ensure the financing of basic 
government tasks such as law and order, health, and education (International Monetary Fund 
[IMF], 2005). The average national revenue from tax in low-income countries was 
approximately 13% of the GDP in 2000 (Baunsgaard & Keen 2005), less than half of the OECD 
average of 34% (OECD, 2011). 
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